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Post Quon: An Analysis of the Evolution of New 
Media and the Employment Relationship 
I. INTRODUCTION 
New Media1 and the employment relationship intersect on several fronts: the 
initial hiring process, maintenance and termination of an employment relationship, 
intraoffice communication, contacts with clients and customers, supply chain 
exchanges, governmental agency relationships, and public relations.2 In each 
scenario, both the employer and employee use New Media platforms to 
communicate with each other and with contingent parties to the employment 
relationship.3 Such New Media usage is integral to the employer-employee 
relationship. 
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 1. The term “New Media” has evolved to mean modes of communication and interaction incepted during 
the digital era. Modes included under the “New Media” umbrella are typically digital, interactive, hypertextual, 
virtual, networked, and simulated. MARTIN LISTER ET AL., NEW MEDIA: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 13 (2d ed. 
2009). See also Vincent Miller, New Media, Networking and Phatic Culture, 14 CONVERGENCE: INT’L J. RES. INTO 
NEW MEDIA TECHS. 387, 387-88 (2008) (noting that blogs and social media websites are examples of new 
media). 
 2. See, e.g., Purple Commc’ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126 (Dec. 11, 2014) (settling a dispute over use of an 
email system, mutually accessible by employer and employee, during nonworking time as permitted); Hispanics 
United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 (Dec. 14, 2012) (holding that an employer’s termination of five 
employees—after finding Facebook comments responding to criticisms of their job performance—was a 
violation of the National Labor Relations Act); Gen. Motors, LLC, No. 07-CA-53570, 2012 WL 1951391 
(N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges May 30, 2012) (finding that an employer’s social media policy to be overbroad and 
prohibitive of employees’ exercise of rights). 
 3. See supra note 2; Memorandum OM 12-31 from Lafe E. Solomon, Acting Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Labor 
Relations Bd. 2 (Jan. 24, 2012), http://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45807d6567. 
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In 2010, the United States Supreme Court, citing O’Connor v. Ortega,4 held in 
City of Ontario v. Quon5 that “a court must consider ‘[t]he operational realities of 
the workplace’ in order to determine whether an employee’s Fourth Amendment 
rights are implicated.”6 Since the Quon decision, questions remain as to the extent 
of an employee’s protected privacy rights regarding content posted on New Media 
platforms that exceed the physical boundaries of the workplace under the Fourth 
Amendment7 and an employee’s protected speech and assembly rights under the 
First Amendment.8 
In today’s workplace, there is a conflict between employees’ personal use and 
employees’ professional use of New Media communication tools such as “blogs, 
wikis, RSS feeds, instant messaging (IM), e-newsletters, Twitter (micro-blogging), 
YouTube, Facebook, cloud computing, podcasting, tagging, and Web 2.0 tools.”9 
Employers use many of these New Media tools and technologies. Some employers 
provide their employees with hardware and access.10 Other employers shift the 
financial burden associated with keeping current technology to the employee, 
offering to reimburse employees who use their own hardware devices––often at a 
savings to the employer.11 New Media platforms present unique difficulties for 
employers in the sense that the platforms and material posted by employees are 
digital, not physical.12 Employees are not constrained by physical brick-and-mortar, 
 4. 480 U.S. 709 (1987). The case involved an employer-initiated physical search of an employee-
physician’s office without his consent while he was on administrative leave pending investigation. Id. at 712–14. 
In addressing the Fourth Amendment interplay, the Court noted “[t]he operational realities of the workplace, 
however, may make some employees’ expectations of privacy unreasonable when an intrusion is by a supervisor 
rather than a law enforcement official.” (emphasis in original). Id. at 717. 
 5. 560 U.S. 746, 750 (2010) (addressing employees’ expectation of privacy in digital communications that 
occurred during and after work hours on an employer-provided device). 
 6. Id. at 756. (quoting O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 717). 
 7. See, e.g., Saby Ghoshray, The Emerging Reality of Social Media: Erosion of Individual Privacy Through 
Cyber-Vetting and Law’s Inability to Catch Up, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 551, 566, 572–73 (2013). 
 8. See, e.g., Patricia Sánchez Abril, Avner Levin & Alissa Del Riego, Blurred Boundaries: Social Media 
Privacy and the Twenty-First-Century Employee, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 63, 90–93 (2012). 
 9. Susan A. O’Sullivan-Gavin & John H. Shannon, Managing the Impact of New Media on the Employment 
Relationship, 4 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 451, 451 (2011). 
 10. See, e.g., Michael S. Dicke & Catherine Kevane, FENWICK WEST LLP, Game of Phones: Employer-Issued 
Smartphones and Employee Fifth Amendment Protections, SEC. LITIG. AND ENFORCEMENT NEWSL. (Nov. 19, 
2015), http://www.fenwick.com/publications/Pages/Securities-Litigation-and-Enforcement-Newsletter-
November-2015.aspx#article3?utm_source=Mondaq&utm_medium=syndication&utm_campaign=View-
Original; (discussing an SEC insider trading action where Capital One issued smartphones to its employees to 
conduct company business); Rachel King, New Smartphone Laws Could Mean Headaches for Employers, WALL 
ST. J.: CIO JOURNAL (Aug. 26, 2014, 6:43 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2014/08/26/new-smartphone-laws-
could-mean-headaches-for-employers/; Karla L. Miller, @Work Advice: When Your Employer Gives You a 
Smartphone. . ., WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/magazine/atwork-
advice-when-your-employer-gives-you-a-smartphone-/2015/01/09/ad289b80-8ae8-11e4-a085-
34e9b9f09a58_story.html. 
 11. See, e.g., Elise Ackerman, Calculating the True Cost of BYOD, FORBES (May 28, 2013, 1:23 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/eliseackerman/2013/05/28/calculating-the-true-cost-of-byod/#1bd576c3685d. 
 12. O’Sullivan-Gavin & Shannon, supra note 9, at 453, 465. 
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traditional notions of “9 to 5” workdays, or past generations’ attitudes of loyalty to 
employers or organizations.13 Employees can post content and information––both 
fact and opinion based––on these new digital platforms from anywhere and at any 
time.14 Information and content can be posted prior to employment with a 
company, during employment, or during employment but when employees are not 
physically at work.15 Today, employers who search, review, store, and act upon 
applicant and employee digital information (with or without the knowledge of the 
individual) can create myriad legal issues for both the employer and the employee.16 
Employers must be aware of the legal implications of access to and ownership of 
digital information and material, and the potential legal repercussions that arise 
when utilizing employees’ information or material during both the hiring process 
and the ongoing employment relationship.17 Current trends in the business world—
such as “BYOD” (Bring Your Own Devices), the pervasive nature of social media 
platforms, and the ability to instantly access an individual’s private information on 
the Internet—have exacerbated conflicts between employers and employees relative 
to expectations of privacy in content and information, both personal and work 
related, on New Media communication platforms.18 
This paper examines the development of regulatory rulings and memoranda 
relative to the impact of New Media on the employer-employee relationship since 
the seminal Quon decision in 2010. The analysis explores employer obligations and 
employee rights that expand from a narrow Fourth Amendment privacy 
 13. Id. at 451 (noting that employee interactions now occur in “off-site internet connections, Wi-Fi access, 
or hot-spots”);, id. at 459-60 (“Employees might not take the time to consider that a post to a blog or a social 
network could harm the reputation of the company. . . .”), id. at 465 (“Courts are now confronted with 
expectations of both employers and employees relative to intangible ‘spaces’ and information obtained, stored, 
and accessed beyond the brick and mortar of the workplace.”); See also Latest Telecommunication Statistics, 
GLOBAL WORKPLACE ANALYTICS.COM (Jan. 2016), http://globalworkplaceanalytics.com/telecommuting-statistics 
(noting that the “non-self-employed population” that works at home has increased 103% since 2005, and 3.7 
million employees now work from home at least half of the time) (last update Jan. 2016). 
 14. O’Sullivan-Gavin & Shannon, supra note 9, at 451. 
 15. See id.; Nicky Jatana, Cynthia Sandoval & Leslie Glyer, Advising Employers on the Use of Social Media in 
the Workplace, 34 L.A. LAW., no. 11, Feb. 2012, at 12. 
 16. See O’Sullivan-Gavin & Shannon, supra note 9, at 451–52 (“Employers and businesses that do not 
understand the importance and ramifications of these new communication tools may find that they have 
inadvertently opened the door to litigation and liability . . . .”). See generally, Memorandum OM 12-31 from 
Lafe E. Solomon, supra note 3 (summarizing numerous legal disputes arising from employer misuse of 
employee digital information). 
 17. Teresa A. Daniel, Managing and Leveraging Workplace Use of Social Media, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE 
MGMT. (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.shrm.org/templatestools/toolkits/pages/managingsocialmedia.aspx. 
 18. E.g., City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010) (where city police officer had no expectation of 
privacy to text messages sent and received on his work pager); MICHAEL J. EASTMAN, U.S. CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE, A SURVEY OF SOCIAL MEDIA ISSUES BEFORE THE NLRB 5, 7 (2011), 
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/reports/NLRB%20Social%20Media%20Survey.pdf 
(examining instances where employers discharge or take improper action against employees because of their 
social media posts). 
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application19 to a broader perspective that encompasses First Amendment privacy, 
speech, and assembly protections in various workplace contexts.20 As modern 
workplaces adapt to evolving New Media technology and platforms, employers 
seeking to avoid contentious litigation, marring publicity, and damaging morale 
must monitor and be poised to respond to current developments that are shaping 
legal obligations at state and federal levels. Guidance from case law and regulatory 
agencies, such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB), helps employers understand their new obligations in the evolving 
employment relationship. 
II. PRIVACY RIGHTS 
Individual privacy is the driving force behind the conflict between employers’ and 
employees’ use of New Media platforms and access to individuals’ social media. 
Whereas historically, employees’ expectations of privacy were limited in the 
physical sense (an office, plant, company vehicle, or other physical location), 
employees maintained their individual privacy rights relative to their lives outside 
of the workplace.21 However, technological developments such as laptops, tablets, 
and mobile telephones create an artificial expectation of a 24/7, on-demand 
employee with no tangible or intangible boundaries between workplaces and 
private lives.22 Correspondingly, employees are experiencing decreased levels of 
privacy in their lives outside the workplace as employers monitor the Internet and 
social media platforms for information relative to company name, products, 
proprietary information, and in particular, employee behavior.23 
In this respect, there are often three competing interests relative to the 
employee’s claims of privacy: the employee, employer, and the companies gathering 
the public information (Figure 1). 
 19. See infra Part II. 
 20. See infra Parts III, IV, V. 
 21. See Stephen E. Henderson, Expectations of Privacy in Social Media, 31 MISS. C. L. REV. 227, 233, 238–39 
(2012) (explaining the inextricable connection between information privacy and personhood and the right to 
maintain privacy in different areas of life); Lewis Maltby, Employment Privacy: Is There Anything Left?, 39 A.B.A. 
HUM. RTS. MAG., no. 3, 2013, 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/2013_vol_39/may_2013_n2_privacy
/employment_privacy.html (describing avenues for employers to measure off-duty employee behavior that did 
not exist prior to the digital age).  
 22. See Abril, Levin & Riego, supra note 8, at 64. 
 23. See, e.g., PROSKAUER ROSE LLP, SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE WORKPLACE AROUND THE WORLD 3.0, at 1–2 
(2014), http://www.proskauer.com/files/uploads/Documents/Survey-Social-Networks-in-the-Workplace-
Around-the-World.pdf. 
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Figure 1: Information Access in the Era of New Media 
 
This intersection of opposing concerns can result in violations of individuals’ 
private information.24 According to the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) Chair, Jacqueline A. Berrien, “[t]he increasing use of social 
media in the 21st century workplace presents new opportunities as well as questions 
and concerns.”25 Employers use different types of social media26 for several different 
reasons: employee engagement and knowledge-sharing, such as having a corporate 
Facebook page or blog to keep employees in far-flung offices aware of new 
programs or policies; marketing to clients, potential customers, and crisis 
management; and recruitment and hiring of new employees.27 The Society for 
 24. See O’Sullivan-Gavin & Shannon, supra note 9, at 455; Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity 
Comm’n, Social Media Is Part of Today’s Workplace but Its Use May Raise Employment Discrimination 
Concerns (Mar. 12, 2014) [hereinafter EEOC Press Release], http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/3-12-
14.cfm. 
 25. See EEOC Press Release, supra note 24. 
 26. Corporate intranets are not social media platforms since they are generally accessible only to employees 
with approved corporate passwords or credentials. 
 27. See EEOC Press Release, supra note 24. 
 Post Quon 
184 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
Human Resource Management (SHRM) surveyed its members over several years, 
and found that 77 percent of companies surveyed reported in 2013 that they used 
social networking sites to recruit candidates.28 This was a 34 percent increase from 
2008.29 According to Melissa Goemann, the American Civil Liberty Union’s (ACLU) 
Legislative Director for Maryland, these issues represent a “huge emerging field of 
law, . . . and with the explosion of social media . . . it’s inevitable that this is going to 
become a really big issue.”30 In the employment relationship, these emerging issues 
begin with the recruitment and hiring process. Employers can learn how to 
successfully manage these issues and avoid adverse legal actions by taking direction 
from recent decisions and legal memorandum that federal agencies have issued on 
these matters. 
III. THE EEOC AND THE IMPACT OF NEW MEDIA ON THE HIRING OF 
INDIVIDUALS 
A major concern regarding an employer’s use of New Media involves the 
recruitment and hiring process. Employer access to information relative to a 
potential candidate via various New Media platforms could potentially result in 
allegations of discriminatory hiring actions based upon an employee’s status in 
protected classes, such as race, sex, color, religion, national origin,31 age,32 
pregnancy,33 and genetic disposition.34 In addition, employers could face legal 
actions for allegations of illegal discrimination against additional protected classes 
at the state level, such as marital status, gender orientation and gender identity.35 
Employers should be cautious and follow best practices when incorporating 
social media in employment screening. Jonathan Segal, a partner at Duane Morris 
LLP, recommends employers follow four best practices when using social media to 
screen job candidates to help employers achieve the benefits of social media, while 
minimizing legal risks.36 They include: 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Mike Bock & Josh Cooper, Legislators Concerned About Monitoring of Employee, Student Social Media, 
SOUTHERN MD. ONLINE (Feb. 24, 2012), http://somd.com/news/headlines/2012/15138.shtml. 
 31. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
 32. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012)). 
 33. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e (2012)). 
 34. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff–2000ff-11 (2012) and in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 
U.S.C.). 
 35. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 20-606 (West 2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 2013). 
 36. Michael Bologna, Social Media Strategies in Recruiting, Hiring Pose Legal Risks for Employers, 
BLOOMBERG BNA (Apr. 21, 2014), http://www.bna.com/social-media-strategies-n17179889714/. 
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• Social media checks should be conducted at the end of the hiring 
process, together with any required background checks. 
• Social media screenings should examine only “public profile” 
information. Employers should not demand an applicant’s 
passwords for social media accounts. 
• Employers should develop policies for determining when social 
media screenings are appropriate and perform such checks on a 
consistent basis. 
• Employers should document any adverse actions. Employers are 
entitled to disqualify applicants exhibiting dangerous, harassing 
or illegal conduct on their public social media sites. Employers 
should document and store such information in case an applicant 
later asserts discrimination.37 
In addition to employers avoiding legal issues in the screening process, employers 
must also be aware of issues that may arise once information is obtained from 
various New Media sources, stored and, perhaps, acted upon.38 
The EEOC suggests employers monitor hiring practices for misuse of social 
media information.39 In 2014, EEOC Acting Associate Legal Counsel, Carol 
Miaskoff, testified that the EEOC addressed some of the issues surrounding the use 
of social media: 
In one reported decision arising from the federal sector, EEOC’s Office of 
Federal Operations found that a claim of racial harassment due to a co-
worker’s Facebook postings could go forward. Additionally, in response to a 
letter from Senators Charles Schumer and Richard Blumenthal, the EEOC 
reiterated its long-standing position that personal information - such as 
that gleaned from social media postings may not be used to make 
employment decisions on prohibited bases, such as race, gender, national 
origin, color, religion, age, disability or genetic information.40 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See EEOC Press Release, supra note 24; Written Testimony of Carol R. Miaskoff, Acting Assoc. Legal 
Counsel, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n (Mar. 12, 2014), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/3-12-
14/miaskoff.cfm#fn34 (citing Letter from Todd A. Cox, Director, Office of Commc’ns & Legislative Affairs, U.S. 
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, to Senator Charles E. Schumer, U.S. Senate (May 15, 2012) (on file with the 
U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n)). 
 40. EEOC Press Release, supra note 24. See also Written Testimony of Lynne Bernabei, Esq., Bernabei & 
Wachtel, PPLC (Mar. 12, 2014), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/3-12-14/bernabei.cfm. Various courts have 
grappled with New Media in the employment context. E.g., Amira-Jabbar v. Travel Services, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 
2d 77, 81, 83, 87, 90, 94 (D.P.R. 2010) (granting motion for summary judgment to employer-defendant after 
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Quoting from a 2010 informal discussion letter from the EEOC, Miaskoff noted 
that “the [Equal Employment Opportunity] laws do not expressly permit or 
prohibit use of specified technologies . . . . The key question . . . is how the selection 
tools are used.”41 Specifically, relative to employers’ utilization of New Media to 
obtain information about job candidates and current employees, the EEOC 
recommends employers do the following to avoid legal claims/actions by 
employees: develop clear policies that prohibit use of an applicant’s social media 
postings in hiring decisions.42 These policies may assist employers defending against 
discrimination claims in hiring. Moreover, the EEOC should: 
• Define situations in which it would be appropriate for employers 
to discipline an employee based on the employee’s social media 
postings. 
• Articulate that an employee’s use of social media to support a 
discrimination claim of another employee, or to advocate for 
changes in the work environment to eliminate discrimination, are 
clearly protected activities, and cannot serve as a basis for 
discipline. 
• Develop guidance on the extent to which an employee’s outside-
of-work social media activities can be used as evidence of 
discrimination or a hostile work environment for which the 
employer may be held liable.43 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) addressed many of the same concerns voiced 
by the EEOC regarding employers’ access to, and storage of, employees’ private 
information via New Media.44 
IV. THE FTC AND THE IMPACT OF NEW MEDIA ON THE HIRING OF 
INDIVIDUALS 
Often during the recruitment and hiring process, employers will conduct extensive 
background checks, including credit checks, on employee candidates as part of the 
finding it appropriate took action to block Facebook access for office computers, and thus did not create a Title 
VII hostile as plaintiff had alleged); Nieman v. Grange Mutual Ins. Co., No. 11-3404, 2013 WL 1332198, at *1, 
*6–*7, *23 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 2013) (noting there was no evidence that hiring manager ever had a LinkedIn 
account or even used LinkedIn to allegedly determine pro se plaintiff’s age, which was the basis of his age 
discrimination claims); Complaint Class Action Civil Rights Conspiracy at 4–8, Guardian Civic League, Inc. v. 
Phila. Police Dep’t, No. 2:09-cv-03148-CMR (E.D. Pa. July 15, 2009) (alleging employer police department 
created a hostile work environment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by allowing white police officers to operate a racist 
website and to post racially offensive comments while on and off duty). 
 41. EEOC Press Release, supra note 24. 
  42.     Written Testimony of Lynne Bernabei, supra note 40. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See infra Part IV. 
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process to ascertain applicants’ fit for a particular position within the company.45 
The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) requires that 
[C]onsumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the 
needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other 
information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with 
regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of 
such information in accordance with the requirements of [Subchapter III].46 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is the federal enforcement agency charged 
with enforcing FCRA.47 As part of the hiring process, employers often review the 
credit history of applicants, particularly where the job position involves financial 
responsibility or access to company finances, inventory, or other proprietary 
financial information.48 
Employers who conduct financial or credit background checks must be careful 
to avoid actions that result in discriminatory outcomes. Both the FTC and the 
EEOC recognize that employers are conducting financial background checks on 
potential employees, and have issued a joint publication discussing employers’ 
conduct before reports are received (from a consumer report agency), the use of 
such information, and the maintenance and secured disposal of the information.49 
The FTC also reminds employers and credit-reporting agencies that information 
 45. See, e.g., Written Testimony of Barbara Arnwine, President, Lawyer’s Comm. for Civil Rights Under 
Law, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/4-15-
15/arnwine.cfm#fn8. 
 46. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). 
 47. Id. § 1681s. 
 48. See, e.g., SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., BACKGROUND CHECKING—THE USE OF CREDIT BACKGROUND 
CHECKS IN HIRING DECISIONS 3 (2012), 
http://www.shrm.org/research/surveyfindings/articles/pages/creditbackgroundchecks.aspx (finding that of 
surveyed organizations that conduct background checks on select job candidates, 87% conduct credit checks on 
candidates applying for positions with financial responsibilities). The top two reasons for conducting 
background checks are to prevent theft and embezzlement and reduce of liability from negligent hiring. Id. at 2. 
In terms of credit history, the Fair Credit Reporting Act provides:  
(1) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘‘consumer report’’ means any written, oral, or other communication of any 
information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, credit 
capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to 
be used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’s 
eligibility for— 
 (A) credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes;  
 (B) employment purposes; or  
 (C) any other purpose authorized under section 1681b of this title.  
    15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d). 
 49. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N & FED. TRADE COMM’N, BACKGROUND CHECKS: WHAT EMPLOYERS 
NEED TO KNOW [hereinafter BACKGROUND CHECKS: WHAT EMPLOYERS NEED TO KNOW], 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/background_checks_employers.cfm (last visited Feb. 25, 2016). 
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gathered via social media must comply with the FCRA.50 Employers must take 
several steps prior to obtaining a background or credit check on a possible 
employee. They must: give written notice to the applicant; describe the nature and 
scope of any investigative report; obtain the applicant’s written permission; and 
certify to the consumer report agency that the company gave notice to, and 
obtained, the applicant’s permission, has complied with FCRA, and “won’t 
discriminate against the applicant or employee, or otherwise misuse the 
information in violation of federal or state equal opportunity laws or regulations.”51 
It is not only employers, but also credit report agencies, that must comply with 
the FCRA.52 When amassing online information, credit report agencies in violation 
of FCRA face fines, such as in United States v. Spokeo, Inc.53 In Spokeo, the data 
collection company entered into a consent decree (without admitting liability) to 
pay an $800,000 penalty after the FTC alleged that it violated the FCRA by failing to 
give notice to consumers, marketing consumer profiles, and failing to assure the 
accuracy of those profiles.54 The Spokeo55 case was “the FTC’s first Fair Credit 
Reporting Act case addressing the collection of online info[rmation] – including 
data from social networking sites – when used in the context of employment 
screening.”56 Employers utilizing New Media platforms and/or information 
gathering companies must ascertain that their own actions, and the actions of any 
retained information gathering company, comport with the requirements of the 
FCRA, or face potential legal action from candidates and employees, and 
enforcement actions from agencies at both the state and federal levels.57 
 50. Lesley Fair, The Fair Credit Reporting Act & Social Media: What Businesses Should Know, FED. TRADE 
COMMISSION: BUS. BLOG (Jun. 23, 2011, 10:23 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-
blog/2011/06/fair-credit-reporting-act-social-media-what-businesses. 
 51. BACKGROUND CHECKS: WHAT EMPLOYERS NEED TO KNOW, supra note 49. 
 52. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C § 1681 (2012). 
 53. Consent Decree & Order for Civil Penalties, Junction & Other Relief at 4, United States v. Spokeo, Inc., 
No. cv12-05001 (C.D. Cal. 2012 June 19, 2012). 
 54. Id. at 1–2, 4; Edward Wyatt, U.S. Penalizes Online Company in Sale of Personal Data, N.Y. TIMES, June 
12, 2012, at B2. 
 55. Consent Decree, Spokeo, No. cv12-05001, supra note 53, at 4 (“In its marketing and advertising, the 
company has promoted the use of its profiles as a factor in deciding whether to interview a job candidate or 
whether to hire a candidate after a job interview. Spokeo purchased thousands of online advertising keywords 
including terms targeting employment background checks, applicant screening, and recruiting. Spokeo ran 
online advertisements with taglines to attract recruiters and encourage HR professionals to use Spokeo to 
obtain information about job candidates’ online activities. . . . Spokeo has affirmatively targeted companies 
operating in the human resources, background screening, and recruiting industries. It created a portion of its 
website intended specifically for recruiters, which was available through a dedicated click tab labeled ‘recruiters’ 
that was prominently displayed at the top of the Spokeo home page. Recruiters were encouraged to ‘Explore 
Beyond the Resume.’ In addition, Defendant promoted the Spokeo.com/HR URL to recruiters in the media and 
in marketing to third parties, and offered special subscription plans for its HR customers.”). 
 56. Lesley Fair, Speaking of Spokeo: Part 2—The Company’s Allegedly Bogus Endorsements, FED. TRADE 
COMMISSION: BUS. BLOG (Jun. 13, 2012, 12:25 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-
blog/2012/06/speaking-spokeo-part-2-companys-allegedly-bogus-endorsements.  
 57. See supra notes 45–56 and accompanying text.  
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Conversely, employees who participate in the use of New Media platforms, such 
as Facebook or LinkedIn, should be aware that employer access to voluntarily 
provided financial or contact information on public platforms is not private, legally 
protected information, as held in Sweet v. LinkedIn Corporation.58 In Sweet, plaintiffs 
claimed they were not hired by potential employers due to reference information 
available on their LinkedIn profiles.59 The District Court held that, “LinkedIn’s 
publications of employment histories of the consumers who are the subjects of the 
Reference Searches are not consumer reports because the information contained in 
these histories came solely from LinkedIn’s transactions or experiences with these 
same consumers.”60 The FCRA excludes from the definition of consumer report any 
“report containing information solely as to transactions or experiences between the 
consumer and the person making the report.”61 The plaintiffs gave LinkedIn the 
information with the express intention it be published on the LinkedIn website.62 
The Court also found LinkedIn was not a consumer report agency as defined in the 
FCRA.63 The Court concluded, “[p]laintiffs’ allegations are insufficient to state a 
claim that the list of names and other information about the references included in 
the Reference Search bears on the ‘character, general reputation, mode of living’ 
and other relevant characteristics of the consumers who are the subjects of these 
searches.”64 Most importantly, the Court noted that 
Plaintiffs do not state a claim that the Reference Search results are used or 
intended to be used as a factor in determining whether the subjects of the 
searches are eligible for employment. A communication must be “used or 
expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving 
as a factor in establishing the consumer’s eligibility for . . . employment 
purposes . . . .” in order to be a consumer report.65 
 58. Sweet v. LinkedIn Corp., No. 5:14-cv-04531-PSG, 2015 WL 1744254, at *6, *9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 
2015) (indicating that LinkedIn did not qualify as a “consumer reporting agency” within the meaning of the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act, especially when plaintiffs voluntarily provided their names and employment histories 
for the purpose of publication, and that search results from LinkedIn are not “consumer reports” even if they 
are used for employment purposes). 
 59. Id. at *3–*4. 
 60. Id. at *4. 
 61. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(2)(A)(i) (2012). 
 62. Sweet, 2015 WL 1744254, at *6. 
 63. Id. at *6. 
 64. Id. at *7. The Court also noted that “LinkedIn markets the Reference Search results a [sic] way to 
‘locate[] people’ who might be able to communicate bearing on information about the consumer-subjects of 
these results, not that these results themselves convey bearing on information.” Id. at *8. 
 65. Id. at *8. Per the FCRA, “[t]he term ‘employment purposes’ when used in connection with a consumer 
report means a report used for the purpose of evaluating a consumer for employment, promotion, 
reassignment or retention as an employee.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(h). 
 Post Quon 
190 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
The Court further noted “LinkedIn markets the Reference Search results—and 
therefore expects them to be used—as a way for potential employers to locate 
people who can provide reliable feedback about job candidates and does not market 
the results themselves as a source of reliable feedback about job candidates.”66 The 
information relative to the references did not bear on the “character, general 
reputation, mode of living” and other relevant characteristics of the consumers who 
are the subjects of these searches.67 Instead, the court found that the results from 
Reference Searches are those in the search initiator’s network (the potential 
employer) and not in the target’s network (the Plaintiffs).68 Therefore, the results 
only communicate whether the search initiator, and not the target, has the 
characteristics protected under the FCRA, e.g., character, general reputation, or 
mode of living.69 As a result, credit report agencies and employers can use 
information gathered from LinkedIn or other social media platforms70 as part of 
their background check because employees have voluntarily placed such 
information on public communication platforms.71 
V. THE NLRB AND THE IMPACT OF NEW MEDIA ON INDIVIDUALS 
IN THE WORKPLACE 
Once an employer hires an employee, the employee gains additional federal 
protection from employer access, misuse, and retention of private information 
obtained via New Media communication platforms.72 Employees who use New 
Media platforms to communicate about various issues in the workplace have, since 
the Quon decision in 2010, gained the attention of and the protection of the 
 66. Sweet, 2015 WL 1744254, at *8. 
 67. Id. at *7. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(e) (2012). 
 68. Sweet, 2015 WL 1744254, at *7. 
 69. Id. In essence, the search conducted by the initiator (a potential employer or search company) would 
result in matches—information and people—between the initiator’s data and the references who were provided 
by the Plaintiffs. It would not result in matches in information between the initiator and the Plaintiffs 
themselves. See also Tina A. Syring, Reference Searches Through Social Media Do Not Create FCRA Claims, NAT’L 
L. REV. (May 1, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/reference-searches-through-social-media-do-not-
create-fcra-claims.  
 70. See, e.g., Lesley Fair, Speaking of Spokeo: Part 3, FED. TRADE COMMISSION: BUS. BLOG (Jun. 15, 2012 
11:02 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2012/06/speaking-spokeo-part-3 (reminding 
social media users that information on social media platforms can be used by credit reporting agencies when 
performing background checks for purposes of hiring: “Recent grads. We hate to break the news, but what 
happens in Vegas doesn’t necessarily stay in Vegas. When you’re looking for a job, applying for insurance, or 
trying to get an apartment, know that companies may be checking your report and may look for other 
information about you. And these days, a prime source of data is online, including social networking sites.”). 
 71. See supra text accompanying note 58; Nathan J. Ebnet, It Can Do More Than Protect Your Credit Score: 
Regulating Social Media Pre-Employment Screening with the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 97 MINN. L. REV. 306, 308 
(Nov. 2012) (proposing that if all employers “hire third-party companies to perform social media research and 
submit to the FCRA, employers will obtain reliable applicant information and respect candidate privacy”). 
 72. See generally National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012). 
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National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or “Board”).73 The NLRB is actively shaping 
the legal framework of social media use by employees and employer use of 
information obtained via social and other New Media platforms.74 In several cases, 
the NLRB found employer social media policies overly broad, and thus unlawful, 
because the policies discouraged “protected concerted activity.”75 According to the 
NLRB, “the mere existence of an overly broad social media policy exposes the 
employer to an unfair labor practice charge, even if no disciplinary action is taken 
against an employee.”76 
The privacy implications of employer New Media policies are significant. The 
use of social media and personal devices in the workplace “remains a key target for 
NLRB enforcement.”77 Indeed, the Board “certainly appears to be looking to remain 
relevant in the digital age.”78 The NLRB deems policies that could be “reasonably 
interpreted” to prohibit the use of personal equipment, such as cameras or 
recording devices, as “illegally broad” because “they could be seen as prohibiting 
legally protected uses,” like documenting health and safety violations or unfair labor 
practices.79 The NLRB has reviewed cases that address both employer and employee 
concerns.80 
Since Quon, the NLRB has stepped into the arena of New Media usage and its 
impact on the employment relationship.81 The NLRB has addressed several cases 
where employees were either disciplined or terminated after utilizing New Media to 
 73. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Labor Law 2.0: The Impact of New Information Technology on the 
Employment Relationship and the Relevance of the NLRA, 64 EMORY L.J. 1583, 1585 (2015) (noting that “the rise 
of new information technology has changed the nature of the employment relationship, complicating the 
relationships of production and requiring new interpretations of the language of the NLRA”). 
 74. See supra note 17. 
 75. Id. E.g., Novelis Corp., No. 03-CA-121293, 2015 N.L.R.B. LEXIS at *161–*162 (N.L.R.B. Jan. 30, 2015). 
 76. See supra note 17. See also Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 N.L.R.B. 646 (2004) (explaining that 
the “Board has held that an employer violates Section 8(a)(1) when it maintains a work rule that reasonably 
tends to chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights”). 
 77. Neal I. Korval, Employer Policies Still in the Crosshairs: NLRB General Counsel Issues Report on Employee 
Handbooks, NAT’L L. REV. (June 10, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/employer-policies-still-
crosshairs-nlrb-general-counsel-issues-report-employee-handb. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. (explaining that “the [March 18, 2015] report contains a number of instructive and, in some cases, 
alarming examples of handbook rules the Board has found to be both legal and illegal” and discussing “[s]ome 
key takeaways for employers, both unionized and non-union alike”). See also Memorandum from Richard F. 
Griffin, Jr., Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. (Mar. 18, 2015), at 2, 
http://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4581b37135 (“I am publishing this report. . .with the hope that 
it will help employers to review their handbooks and other rules, and conform them, if necessary, to ensure that 
they are lawful.”) 
 81. See Memorandum from Richard F. Griffin, Jr., Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. (Mar. 18, 
2015), at 8, 14, 16, 20–21, http://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4581b37135 (discussing unlawful 
employer policies that regulated employee conduct with regards to social media).  
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discuss, vent, or denigrate their employer or their employment position.82 In doing 
so, the NLRB has relied upon Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA), which states that employees may “engage in other concerted activities for 
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”83 The NLRB 
determined that the protection of concerted activities under the NLRA applies to 
employees84 relative to concerted discussion about terms and conditions of 
employment, whether or not they belong to a union at their place of business.85 The 
NLRB defines terms and conditions of employment to mean performance, staffing 
or workload issues, supervisory issues, and pay, to name a few.86 
The NLRB has issued three memoranda relative to New Media and the 
employment arena since 2010—in August 2011, January 2012, and May 201287—
”[t]o help provide further guidance to practitioners and human resource 
 82. See generally Memorandum OM 11-74 from Lafe E. Solomon, Acting Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Labor 
Relations Bd. (Aug. 18, 2011), at 3, 5–7, 9, http://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458056e743 
(explaining NLRB decisions involving protected concerted conduct and unlawful employee discharges 
following social media-based activity). E.g., Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc. 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 (Dec. 14, 
2012) (holding that an employer “violated Section 8(a)(1) of the [National Labor Relations] Act by discharging 
five employees for Facebook comments they wrote in response to a coworker’s criticisms of their job 
performance”). 
 83. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). In full, section 7 of the NLRA 
provides: 
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain 
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the 
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from 
any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring 
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) [section 
8(a)(3)] of this title. Id.  
 84. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (“The term ‘employee’ shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to 
the employees of a particular employer, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any 
individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or 
because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent 
employment, but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic 
service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any 
individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any 
individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time, or by any 
other person who is not an employer as herein defined.”). 
 85. See N.L.R.B. v. Columbia Univ., 541 F.2d 922, 931 (2d Cir. 1976) (“[T]here can be little doubt that the 
protection afforded to concerted activities under the NLRA applies equally to workers in unionized or in non-
unionized firms.”); Rita Gail Smith & Richard A. Parr II, Protection of Individual Action as Concerted Activity 
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 369, 371–73 (1983) (“Section 7 protects employees 
engaged in concerted activity in a wide variety of circumstances. . . .”) 
 86. See Employee Rights, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/employee-rights 
(last visited Feb. 26, 2016); Memorandum OM 11-74 from Lafe E. Solomon, supra note 82, at 4–5, 21; Mischa 
Gaus, How to Deal With Social Media at Work, ALTERNET (Mar. 9, 2012), 
http://www.alternet.org/story/154493/how_to_deal_with_social_media_at_work (including “workload, job 
performance, wage issues, [and] staffing levels” as “terms and conditions of employment”). 
 87. The NLRB and Social Media, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/fact-
sheets/nlrb-and-social-media (last visited Jan. 22, 2016). 
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professionals.”88 More specifically, the NLRB’s approach to the nature of New 
Media in the employment arena has resulted in a division of current issues into two 
separate topic areas: First is an examination of employees’ use of New Media 
platforms, the context of employee posts, and the legality of their subsequent 
discipline or termination.89 Second is the scope and nature of the company’s social 
media policy when applied to employee disciplinary or termination actions.90 Given 
the new and evolving nature of social media cases, the Acting General Counsel for 
the NLRB, Lafe Solomon, directed that all cases believed to be meritorious are to be 
directed from NLRB regional offices to the agency’s Division of Advice in 
Washington, D.C., “in the interest of tracking them and devising a consistent 
approach.”91 A January 2012 NLRB Press Release noted that the second 
memorandum “represents the Acting General Counsel’s interpretation of the 
National Labor Relations Act as it applies to forms of communication that did not 
exist when the Act was written.”92 The Acting General Counsel defined social media 
as “includ[ing] various online technology tools that enable people to communicate 
easily via the internet to share information and resources. These tools can 
encompass text, audio, video, images, podcasts, and other multimedia 
communications.”93 
 88. Press Release, Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., Acting General Counsel Issues Second Social Media Report 
(Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Second Social Media Report Press Release], https://www.nlrb.gov/news-
outreach/news-story/acting-general-counsel-issues-second-social-media-report.  
 89. See The NLRB and Social Media, supra note 87. The first memorandum issued in August 2011 discussed 
various cases involving employees’ use of social media in unprotected versus protected concerted activity and 
overly-broad employer social media policies. E.g., Memorandum OM 11-74 from Lafe E. Solomon, supra note 
82, at 5–6, (discussing a case in which an employee was unlawfully terminated after posting negative remarks 
about her supervisor on her personal Facebook page). The second memorandum issued in January 2012 
examined several cases involving unlawful versus lawful and discharges of employees for Facebook posts. E.g., 
Memorandum OM 12-31 from Lafe E. Solomon, supra note 3, at 5, (discussing a case in which an employer 
clearly terminated an employee in retaliation for initiating a Facebook discussion about adverse working 
conditions in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA). 
 90. See The NLRB and Social Media, supra note 87. The second memorandum issued in January 2012 
looked at cases involving questions about employer policy scope as being unlawfully broad versus lawful. E.g., 
Memorandum OM 12-31 from Lafe E. Solomon, supra note 3, at 8, (discussing an unlawfully broad solicitation 
rule that “prohibit[ed] employee solicitation on company property during non-work time”). The third 
memorandum issued in May 2012 summarized seven employer policies specifically governing use of social 
media by employees. E.g., Memorandum OM 12-59 from Lafe E. Solomon, Acting Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Labor 
Relations Bd., at 5, (May 30, 2012), http://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4580a375cd (finding 
unlawful “provisions that threaten employees with discharge or criminal prosecution for failing to report 
unauthorized access to or misuse of confidential information,” but finding lawful a portion of a handbook 
section “that admonishes employees to ‘[d]evelop a healthy suspicion[,]’ cautions against being tricked into 
disclosing confidential information, and urges employees to ‘[b]e suspicious if asked to ignore identification 
procedures’”). 
 91. Second Social Media Report Press Release, supra note 88. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Memorandum OM 11-74 from Lafe E. Solomon, supra note 82, at 2. See also O’Sullivan-Gavin & 
Shannon, supra note 9, at 452. 
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It is up to employers to stay current on NLRB determinations of what 
constitutes “overly broad” in terms of the company policy. Such “overly broad” 
language will be found to be an unfair labor practice under Section 8 of the NLRA 
because it interferes with an employee’s rights to concerted activities under Section 
7 of the NLRA.94 Mischa Gaus, a former editor of Labor Notes,  noted “[a]ny 
communication by a worker (spoken or written) that was protected before 
Facebook is still protected.”95 These messages have to be among co-workers and 
relate to the “terms and conditions” of employment: workload, job performance, 
wage issues, staffing levels.”96 However, employees also need to be aware that not all 
posts will be protected. Posts that “violate an employer’s privacy policy, disparage 
the employer or its products, or are ‘so disloyal, reckless, or maliciously untrue’ as 
to lose the law’s protection” can result in discipline.97 Health care employees must 
also be careful not to violate any patient privacy protections online.98 
The NLRB applies several tests in determining whether or not a policy is overly 
broad. First, the Board examines whether or not the language of the policy 
interferes under Section 8 of the NLRA with employees’ rights to concerted 
activities under Section 7 of the NLRA.99 Policies that unreasonably restrict 
employee rights to discuss terms and conditions of employment will be found to be 
overly broad and not upheld.100 An employer violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act 
through the maintenance of a work rule if that rule would “reasonably tend to chill 
employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.”101 
The Board uses a two-step inquiry to determine if a work rule would have such a 
chilling effect.102 First, a rule is unlawful if it explicitly restricts Section 7 activities.103 
If the rule does not explicitly restrict protected activities, it is unlawful only upon a 
showing that: (1) employees would reasonably construe the language to prohibit 
Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was promulgated in response to union activity; or (3) 
 94. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012). 
 95. Gaus, supra note 86. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. (citing Emarco, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. 832, 833 (1987)). 
 98. Id. 
 99. See, e.g., Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824, 825–26, 828 (1998) (stipulating that employer-hotel 
violated section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by maintaining certain unacceptable conducts—such as prohibiting false, 
profane, or malicious statements about the hotel or its employees—which would tend to chill employees in the 
exercise of section 7 rights, but holding that other standards of conduct—like prohibiting uncooperative 
behavior that is contrary to the hotel’s goals and objectives—were not in violation of section 8(a)(1)). 
 100. See id. at 831, 833 (Board precedent holds that mere maintenance of an overly broad rule is unlawful, 
even if not enforced, because it tends to restrain employees’ from engaging in otherwise protected activity); 
Ingram Book Co., Div. of Ingram Indus., Inc., 315 N.L.R.B. 515, 516 (1994) (explaining that a rule is overly 
broad, and thus invalid, when the mere maintenance of the rule restricts employees from protected activity). 
 101. Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. at 825. 
 102. Martin Luther Mem’l Home, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 646, 646?47 (2004). 
 103. Id. at 646. 
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the rule has been applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights.104 Second, when 
reviewing the discharge of an employee, the Board applies the standards from the 
Meyers cases.105 In the Meyers cases, the Board explained that an activity is concerted 
when an employee acts “with or on the authority of other employees and not solely 
by and on behalf of the employee himself.”106 The definition of concerted activity 
“encompasses those circumstances where individual employees seek to initiate or to 
induce or to prepare for group action.”107 
Finally, when the statements of the employee are posted online, and are rude, 
profane or offensive, the Board determines whether the employee has lost the 
protection of the NLRA.108 Employers and employees should both be aware that 
rude, disparaging comments or communications (e.g., employee “rants”) are not 
protected under the NLRA109 nor as free speech under the First Amendment.110 
However, similar comments may be afforded protection under the NLRA as 
“concerted activity” if made in the context of a labor dispute between the employer 
and the employee, and not so “not so disloyal, reckless, or maliciously untrue as to 
lose the Act’s protection.”111 In 2011, the United States Chamber of Commerce 
published a survey of social media issues before the NLRB and identified cases 
 104. Id. at 647. See also Memorandum OM 11-74 from Lafe E. Solomon, supra note 82, at 12. 
 105. See Meyers Indus., 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984) [hereinafter Meyers I] (holding that discharge of 
employee was not unfair labor practice, in violation of Section 8(a)(1), because an employee’s actions may be 
concerted for the purposes of the NLRA only if the employee engages in the action with or on the authority of 
other employees, and not solely on behalf of the employee himself), rev’d sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941, 
942 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (finding that the Board erred in rejecting employee’s unfair labor practice charge by 
believing a narrow definition of “concerted activity” was mandated by the NLRA), on remand, Meyers Indus., 
281 N.L.R.B. 882, 882, 889 (1986) [hereinafter Meyers II] (upholding the Meyers I definition of concerted 
activity as reasonable construction of section 7 of the NLRA), aff’d sub nom. Prill v. N.L.R.B., 835 F.2d 1481, 
1482 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (affirming the Board’s decision in Meyers II). 
 106. Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 497. 
 107. Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. at 887. See also Memorandum OM 11-74 from Lafe E. Solomon, supra note 82, 
at 5. 
 108. See, e.g., Atlantic Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 814, 816–17(1979) (employee’s obscene reaction to 
supervisor was unwarranted insubordination, not during a grievance meeting, and therefore a reasonable basis 
for discharge); N.L.R.B. v. Local Union No. 1229, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464, 471, 474–75, 477–78 
(1955) (discharge for cause may be proper on the basis of employee conduct that is separable from concerted 
activities, and thus does not come within protection of Section 7 of the NLRA, e.g., publicly disparaging 
employer and harming company reputation). 
 109. See supra text accompnaying note 108. 
 110. See Graziosi v. City of Greenville, 775 F.3d 731, 733, 741 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that the city’s 
substantial interests in maintaining discipline and preventing insubordination within its police department 
outweighed a terminated sergeant’s criticism of her superior officer on the Mayor’s public Facebook page, 
which was only minimal interest in speaking on a matter of public concern). 
 111. Emarco, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. 832, 833 (1987). See also Memorandum OM 11-74 from Lafe E. Solomon, 
supra note 82, at 9. The Board differentiates Atlantic Steel as applying to “an employee who has made public 
outbursts against a supervisor,” while Jefferson Standard is usually applied “where an employee has made 
allegedly disparaging comments about an employer or its product in the context of appeals to outside or third 
parties.” Id. Under Jefferson Standard, the inquiry is whether the “communication is related to an ongoing labor 
dispute and whether it is not so disloyal, reckless, or maliciously untrue as to lose the Act’s protection.” Id. 
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alleged to have overbroad policies that violated employee rights to protected 
concerted activities under the NLRA.112 The Chamber of Commerce noted cases in 
which employers had adopted restrictive company policies on employee complaint 
procedures, New Media policies that limited or prohibited employees from 
discussing terms and conditions of employment via different New Media tools, and 
policies that restricted employees from using New Media tools to express opinions 
of employers.113 
From 2010 through 2012, the focus of the NLRB decisions was the scope and 
limitations in employer New Media policies.114 The commonality in the cases is the 
attempt by the employer to limit employees “concerted activities” under the 
NLRA.115 Beginning in 2012, the NLRB has extended the scope of review beyond 
 112. See MICHAEL J. EASTMAN, supra note 18, at 26–27. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce survey identified 
the following cases where the employer allegedly promulgated, maintained, and/or enforced overbroad social 
media policies: 
• The Court at South Park, Case No. 11-CA-22900. Overbroad policy related to confidentiality, 
unacceptable conduct, complaint procedures, use of communication systems, and employee participation 
in investigations. 
• Flagler Hospital, Case No. 12-CA-27031. Overbroad social media, blogging, and social networking policy. 
• The H Group, BBT Inc., Case No. 14-CA-30313. Overbroad rules restricting section 7 rights with respect 
to use of external web logs and social networking sites. 
• Sears Holding (Roebucks), Case No. 18-CA-19440. Overly broad social media policy which inhibits 
section 7 rights. 
• Lowes Home Improvement, Case No. 19-CA-32951. Overbroad social networking media policy. 
• Lee Enterprises, Case No. 28-CA-23267. Overbroad rules prohibiting employees from engaging in 
concerted activities, including: not allowing employees to air grievances over social media, not allowing 
employees to post derogatory comments that would damage the company via social media, and requiring 
employees to observe rules regarding professional courtesy. 
• ER Solutions, Inc., Case No. 19-CA-32943. Overly broad policy prohibiting employees from making 
disparaging remarks about the company. 
• BaySys Technologies, LLC, Case No. 05-CA-36314. Manager sent an email stating that employees had 
breached their nondisclosure agreement. 
• Innovation Ventures, Case No. 25-CA-031722. Employer required employees to sign confidentiality 
agreements prohibiting employees from discussing terms and conditions of employment, including 
discharge, with anyone, including co-workers. 
• MET Inc., Case No. 16-CA-27778. An employer policy that forbade employees from discussing workplace 
issues with anyone, including coworkers. 
• BaySys Technologies, LLC, Case No. 05-CA-36314. Employer sent an email expressing disappointment 
that employees took things to a newspaper rather than handling internally. 
• Sodexo, Inc., Case No. 09-CA-46032. Employer maintained a policy that the employer “speak with one 
voice.” 
• Cox Communications, Case No. 05-CA-36476. Employer orally promulgated an overbroad non-
solicitation rule by telling employees they violated a code of ethics by using a company computer to post 
to a website. 
• Golden Living Center, Case No. 09-CA-046173. Employer orally promulgated and maintained an 
overbroad social media policy. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 5?8. 
 115. Id. 
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corporate New Media policies to include consideration of corporate and employee 
activity and disciplinary consequences.116 This broader focus includes analysis that 
recognizes employees’ freedom of speech and assembly rights grounded in the First 
Amendment, and employees’ rights to “concerted activities” provided in the 
NLRA.117 
CONCLUSION 
Currently, both employers and employees are forced to reexamine their policies and 
behaviors in light of rapid technology updates, developing federal case law, and 
administrative law decisions. Similar challenges arise every time a new technology 
provides a platform that disrupts the status quo.118 New Media platforms create 
opportunities and situations where employers and social media intelligence 
organizations have access to an unprecedented amount of information that was 
previously maintained using traditional, more private means.119 Without a uniform 
legal standard, agencies such as the EEOC, FTC, and NLRB are left to respond to 
these new technologies on a case by case basis. The post Quon environment is 
slowly evolving to address the legal challenges faced in a workplace without walls or 
time constraints, where employers are able to examine employees’ public and 
private communications.120 Employers must monitor emerging state and federal 
case law developments and developing administrative law. Federal agencies have 
 116. See World Color (USA) Corp. v. NLRB, 776 F.3d 17, 20–21 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (remanding to the Board a 
dispute over an employer’s hat policy that prohibited employees from wearing baseball caps except for caps 
bearing the company logo); Landry’s Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 69 (Apr. 16, 2015) (finding no violation of section 
8(a)(1) of the NLRA by employer’s 2012 social media policy, which urged, but did not explicitly prohibit, 
employees not to post information regarding the company that could lead to morale issues in the workplace or 
detrimentally affect the company’s business); Dish Network Corp., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 108 (Apr. 30, 2013) 
(ordering company to cease and desist maintenances of policies that prohibited employees from electronically 
posting critical comments about the company on or outside of work hours; required employees to obtain 
authorization from management before speaking about the company to news media outlets or at public 
meetings; banned employees from communicating with government agencies about the organization without 
prior approval; and interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights); 
Boch Imports, Inc., No. 01-CA-071499, 2013 WL 435035 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Feb. 1, 2013) (determining 
that statements made during an employee’s annual review did not violate section 8(a)(1) because they could not 
reasonably be construed as a warning of disciplinary action that would “chill” the employee’s ability to engage 
in union or protected concerted activity); Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164 (Sept. 28, 2012) 
(holding that a “courtesy” rule from car dealership’s employee handbook was unlawful because employees 
would reasonably construe the language to encompass section 7 activity). 
 117. See supra text accompanying note 116. 
 118. See, e.g., Graziosi v. City of Greenville, 775 F.3d 731, 733?35 (5th Cir. 2015) (exemplifying how 
Facebook creates a public platform for private conversations that can drastically alter one’s life); Sweet v. 
LinkedIn Corp., No. 5:14-cv-04531-PSG, 2015 WL 1744254, at *2?*3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2015) (illustrating 
how LinkedIn connects employers to potential job candidates and how the information that one shares on their 
profile can impact an employer’s decision to hire). 
 119. See Ebnet, supra note 71, at 306 (illustrating the rise of social media profiles has made previously 
private information, such as pictures and politically charged remarks, more accessible to employers to review 
when hiring candidates). 
 120. See supra Parts III–V. 
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provided guidance in this arena in the past, and will continue to do so moving 
forward.121 The resultant risks for employers who fail to do so have increased, as 
agency regulations increasingly recognize the reality of a changing workplace. 
 
 121. See supra Parts III–V. 
